The Spanish experience in EU accession by Malo de Molina, José Luis
THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE IN EU ACCESSION
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / ECONOMIC BULLETIN / JANUARY 2003 1
The Spanish experience
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on “Mediterranean Experiences in Accession” in
the Seminar organised jointly by the Central
Bank of Malta and SUERF in St. Julian’s, Malta,
on March 27-28 2003.
SPANISH ACCESSION TO THE EU
Spanish accession to the European Union
and progressive external openness have been
the driving forces behind the modernisation of
the Spanish economy in recent decades. The
Spanish economy was relatively closed and the
process of integration has seen a rapid open-
ing-up, manifest in a growing intensity of trade
and capital flows.
External openness has prompted significant
changes. In particular, it has spurred the essen-
tial measures of macroeconomic and financial
discipline needed to enable Spain to be includ-
ed among the founding members of Economic
and Monetary Union and to position it appropri-
ately in the new globalised economy. Chart 1
displays the intensity and scope of the process.
THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT
TO INTEGRATION REQUIREMENTS
Adapting economic policy to the require-
ments arising from European integration was
complex and costly, with bouts of progress in-
terrupted by occasional setbacks. For an over-
view of key events and features, three different
periods may be distinguished. The initial phase
runs from EU entry to the European Monetary
System (EMS) crisis at end-1992. Thereafter
began the difficult process of achieving nominal
convergence. And the third period covers
Spain’s experience in Monetary Union.
The initial phase
In this phase of strongly expanding activity,
employment and investment, economic policy
goals were geared towards competitiveness
and stability. However, the economic policy mix
implemented was unbalanced (very restrictive
in the case of monetary policy, very expansion-
ary in that of fiscal policy and only a partial use
of the exchange rate discipline afforded by the
EMS). This inappropriate policy mix had an ad-
verse effect on inflation and the real exchange
rate, leading to a build-up of substantial losses
in competitiveness (Chart 2).
Appropriate levels of competitiveness were
restored after a very costly adjustment resulting
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from successive depreciations and from a sharp
contraction in output and employment that
brought about substantial productivity gains.
The exchange rate adjustment was the mar-
kets’ verdict on inappropriate domestic policies,
but it permitted the correction of relative prices
and costs and helped restore business surplus-
es and profits.
Nominal convergence phase
(end-1992 to end-1998)
In response to the shortcomings of the mac-
roeconomic policies adopted until then, it was
decided to re-balance the underpinnings of the
economy for a stability-oriented strategy based
on the criteria established under the Maastricht
Treaty, as a condition for gaining access to
Monetary Union. To this end, tighter budgetary
policies were pursued and a new monetary poli-
cy strategy based on direct inflation targets was
adopted. The success of these policies enabled
exchange rate stability to be gradually regained.
Economic discipline spurred the correction
of the imbalances, setting in motion a series of
virtuous mechanisms which bolstered economic
agents’ confidence and prompted an adjust-
ment of expectations (essentially regarding pric-
es and the budget deficit). This ultimately
proved highly beneficial for implanting an envi-
ronment of macroeconomic stability (Chart 3).
As a result, nominal convergence was com-
patible with a fresh expansionary phase marked
by robust output and employment growth.
Monetary Union phase
Participation in Economic and Monetary Un-
ion since 1999 has allowed Spain to reap the
benefits of sharing a common macroeconomic
standard with the core European countries. This
common standard has two strands.
First, membership of a monetary union,
when conditions are right, allows the link be-
tween interest rates and the exchange rate with
domestic conditioning factors to be broken, per-
mitting greater levels of credibility and confi-
dence to be imported. Breaking this link was
particularly important for Spain since, until then,
turbulence on financial and foreign exchange
markets had often acted as a trigger for bouts
of recession via heavy interest rate rises and
sharp depreciations, which were frequently dis-
proportionate.
Second, monetary union membership in-
volves assuming commitments that entail restric-
tions on domestic policy action: namely, forgoing
the use of the exchange and interest rates as in-
struments to achieve national economic objec-
tives and to correct potential disequilibria. These
restrictions meant other facets of economic policy
had to be reinforced. In particular, a more promi-
nent role had to be assigned to budgetary policy
as an instrument for medium- and long-term sta-
bility, and the liberalisation of the economy had to
be speeded up so that the increase in competi-
tion might make for more flexible responses by
supply to changes in demand.
The establishment of a regime of stability and
the momentum given to flexibility in respect of the
workings of the markets for factors and products
have helped set in place the conditions condu-
cive to sustained growth and for generating more
employment. As a result, throughout the mone-
tary union phase to date, growth in Spain has
outpaced the euro area average, and headway
has been made in real convergence (Chart 4). At
the same time, cyclical oscillations have been
smoothed, which is particularly relevant given
that, in the past, phases of strong growth tended
to end in sharp recessions, moving Spain off
course from convergence.
Nonetheless, during these four years there
has been a persistent inflation differential,
which is a threat to the economy’s competitive-
ness. This and other risks will be dealt with in
greater detail later on.
CHANGES IN THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOUR
OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY AFTER
JOINING MONETARY UNION
The scale of structural changes in the work-
ings of the Spanish economy can be quite
clearly seen if its patterns of behaviour during
the current slowdown are compared with those
of the last cyclical episode of a similar nature.
Notably, in this respect, over the past two
years – approximately in parallel with the current
downturn – the Spanish economy has sustained
moderate but constantly positive growth rates.
These are far removed from the figures posted at
the time of the previous cyclical trough (in 1993),
when the contraction in output was around 2%.
As Chart 5 shows, the changes in the Spanish
economy under Monetary Union have been set
against the considerable benevolence of the re-
cent downturn, compared with the severity of the
recession in the early nineties.
CONTINUITY IN REAL CONVERGENCE
Further, the fact that the Spanish economy
has bottomed out at a relatively high growth
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Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, EUROSTAT and Banco de España.
(a)   Measured with consumer prices.
(b)   Seasonally adjusted series.
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rate has allowed positive growth differences to
be maintained with the euro area average and
permitted continuing progress in real conver-
gence, even during this current slowdown
(Chart 6). That marks a qualitative change from
the traditional pattern of the Spanish economy,
whereby real convergence would fall back dur-
ing recessions, losing much if not all of the
ground gained during upturns.
INTENSIVE GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT
GENERATION
Supporting these two major achievements of
Spain’s EMU experience has been a third differ-
entiating factor, namely the high employment-
creating capacity shown over recent years.
Chart 7 illustrates how, at the recent cyclical
trough, employment continued to grow at a rate
of over 1%, while at the previous low a rate of
decline of employment of around 3% was re-
corded. This difference is fundamental for ex-
plaining the greater resilience of household
spending and the progress in convergence of
per-capita income levels.
ELIMINATION OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT
A final difference between the current slow-
down and that in the early nineties is the differ-
ent role played by public finances (Chart 8).
During the 1993 recession the budget deficit
surged, while the recent phase of weakness
has seen the culmination of the budgetary con-
solidation drive. This factor has been pivotal to
allowing balanced integration within the euro
area and has eliminated the adverse influences
on growth that budgetary imbalances generate.
It has thus been possible to introduce elements
of rationality into public spending, enabling lev-
els of public investment to be restored that are
more in keeping with the need to extend the
economy’s productive capacity. And tax reforms
tending to lower the burden on households and
firms have also been implemented, improving
the incentives for economic efficiency.
CURRENT RISKS: THE INFLATION
DIFFERENTIAL AND SLUGGISH
INVESTMENT
However, the positive features of the Span-
ish economy since it joined Monetary Union
should not mask the emergence of certain de-
velopments whose persistence over time may
alter the steady path of adaptation to economic
and monetary union hitherto followed.
In this respect, the persistent differentials with
the euro area in the growth rate of final prices are
a cause for concern. Since the outset of EMU,
the HICP has grown five percentage points more
in Spain than the euro area average (Chart 9).
This has largely been due to the growth of prices
and margins in the more sheltered sectors, de-
noting an as yet insufficient level of competition in
certain markets, despite progress in recent years.
This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of
the scope of inflation differentials within a mone-
tary union, a subject on which the Banco de Es-
paña has published numerous papers (see the
accompanying references). Nonetheless, the be-
haviour of prices in Spain indicates the presence
of risks in the price formation area which may af-
fect the future competitiveness of exports. And
exports will in the future have to play a key role in
the growth model underpinning the Spanish
economy.
A second source of concern in recent years
is the weakness in business investment in capi-
tal goods. Much more so since this slowdown in
investment projects has come about despite the
fact that the rates of return of companies have
far outperformed borrowing costs. This poor
performance can be attributed to the inhibiting
effect exerted by heightened economic uncer-
tainty, the failure to turn a profit on certain
large-scale investment projects and the sharp
correction of stock market prices. However, in-
vestment must regain its past buoyancy, since
the incorporation of technological innovation
into the productive process and improved pro-
ductivity depend on it.
THE RISKS OF HIGH DEBT
A third factor of risk is the strong increase
seen in household debt to finance the robust
expansion of consumption, and the acquisition
of financial assets and of housing, against the
backdrop of heavy cuts in interest rates and ris-
es in wealth that accompanied the culmination
of nominal convergence and euro area entry.
Household debt as a proportion of disposa-
ble income stood at perhaps 80% in 2002
(Chart 10), a level not far different from the euro
area average and below that in the United
States, but one which has grown most briskly
since 1995 (when it was 45%). In principle, this
increase in the level of household indebtedness
may reflect solely the adjustment to a new equi-
librium, with much lower interest rate levels. If
that is the case, the proportion of debt to dis-
posable income will tend to stabilise. However,
there are elements of inertia related to the dy-
namism of credit for house purchases that may
sustain continued growth.
In this respect, an additional factor of risk is
that the financial equilibria of the household
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sector are very sensitive to house prices. Thus,
an adjustment in these prices in the future
might endanger the sector’s financial sustaina-
bility and any recovery in spending.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
The main challenge facing the Spanish econ-
omy in the medium term, once the temporary ex-
pansionary effects accompanying the transition to
the third stage of EMU have faded, is to maintain
higher growth rates than those of the more ad-
vanced countries and to continue reducing differ-
ences in economic well-being. The cuts in inter-
est rates and the increase in the value of wealth
prompted an expansionary momentum that is not
repeatable. Future growth will have to reside on
the economy’s own capacity in an environment of
strong competition, which will intensify following
the enlargement of the EU.
Growth should thus be investment- and ex-
port-led, and certain constraints must be over-
come, among others those imposed by specific
features of the Spanish economy’s productive
and trade specialisation, namely: the excessive
weight of the construction sector; the concen-
tration of exports in a limited number of produc-
tive branches; and the loss of weight of imports
of high-technology products.
To address these challenges successfully, it
is vital to ensure the economy’s competitive-
ness in the medium and long term, a matter
which hinges crucially on the performance of
productivity. Reforms will be called for in sever-
al areas: to enhance the efficiency of productive
and organisational structures; to adopt leading-
edge technologies; and to see through meas-
ures providing for the flexible working of goods
and services markets and of institutions, in line
with those pursued in recent years. The scope
of such reform will be crucial.
The relative success of the Spanish econo-
my since EU accession and, above all, since
EMU participation is due to it having proven
capable of adapting its macroeconomic re-
gime to standards of stability and promoting
the structural reforms so vitally needed to en-
sure adaptation by markets, economic agents
and institutions. Success in economic per-
formance is hard to maintain for long. For
Spain’s success to persist over time and be
sufficiently sound, structural reform along the
lines of that approved at the Lisbon and Bar-
celona summits must be continued and deep-
ened. Indeed, this is a valid prescription, in
one way or another, for all present and future
EU member countries.
28.3.2003.
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